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Chafing at Anti-Allomorphs 
David Thomas 
Chafe (1970 p. 31-35) speaks of the varying forms for Onondaga 'big' 
as describable in terms either of processes or of allomorphs. (1) He 
claims that a process statement gives a more economical description of 
the Onondaga data; and (2) he also claims that an allomorph description 
necessarily presupposes a too-simple view of psychological reality. I 
consider his two claims questionable, the implication of his two claims 
not logically implied, and his first dichotomy not logically necessary. 
(1) Chafe claims that a process statement of the data allows for 
greater generalization to other Onondaga data since a causality rule is 
more powerful than the sheer memorization of forms. This is true. But 
he overlooks the principle of analogical formation, which is also more 
powerful than the sheer memorization of forms, and which was a principle 
around which much linguistic study has been built, including work of 
such people as Bloomfield, Sapir, and Martinet. That analogical forma-
tion does actually operate in language is clearly seen in folk-etymologies 
and in many children's speech forms. This would considerably weaken the 
claim for the descriptive superiority of a process statement. And Chafe's 
own diagrams (p. 34) of the two vie-r~s show the allomorph statement as 
descriptively simpler for the data presented. 
(2) With regard to psychological reality, I would question Chafe's 
restatement of the relevant assumptions of the 11Bloomfieldian11 era. 
(I, like Chafe, learned my basic linguistics in the 1950's (1950-1954.) 
I would restate the assUlllption to say that the brain is capable of a higl:I 
17 
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degree of abstraction, but that in the interests of careful science 
we should not posit abstractions to any degree beyond what is empirically 
verifiable or justifiable. With the assumption behind Bloomfieldian 
theory and practice restated this way, Chafe's claims for the psychologi-
cal superiority of process statements are weakened. 
Then, even if we should grant, for the sake of the argument, that 
a process statement for the Onondaga data is better than an allomorph 
statement, it does not follow that process statements are better than 
allomorph statements for all language data. Some cases, such as the 
irregular English~'.!!:!,, is forms, are surely much more simply handled 
by allomorph statements than by process statements. A theory of language 
that allows both process statements and allomorph statements is a more 
powerful tool than a theory which restricts itself to either one or the 
other, and I feel it is truer to the complex reality of language. 
To turn to Chafe's beginning assumption, he presents us with an 
either/or choice -- process or allomorphs. And by process he means 
positing an underlying theoretical form. This forced choice is unnecessa 
and in fact neither alternative appeals to me as a good solution. There 
are at least two other good alternatives. One alternative is a process 
statement which builds not on a theoretical underlying form but on the 
most common or the most convenient actually occurring form, this form 
then being labelled the basic form to which the processes are applied. 
This model relieves the necessity of positing unverifiable abstract 
forms, yet still retains the advantages of processes. The psychological 
basis for this model includes the notion that a very common form of a 
word will generally become subconsciously considered more basic than an 
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uncommon form of a word, hence the descriptive choice by the linguist 
of the most common form as basic, all else being equal. Also included 
in this model is the assumption that a form occurring in isolation is 
generally psychologically conceived of as more basic than a bound form. 
And a form containing predictable deletions or additions is less basic 
than an unpredictable form (Nida 1947).. Where only one of these factors 
is found, the form thus indicated would be considered basic. Where these 
factors are found in conflict, the linguist must weigh the factors to decide 
which form to cons:f.der basic, or else the psychological possibility must be 
permitted of holding two or more forms as equally basic. 
Another alternative is a paradigmatic statement of allomorphs, a bat-
tery statement positing an underlying semantic entity (sememe?) which finds 
its manifestation in different forms in different environments, analogous 
to the batteries that can be set up for clauses -(Thomas 1964, 1973). This 
has the advantage over Chafe's and Nida's processes that it can handle 
equally well regular and irregular forms, specifying manifesting regular 
forms as deducible from normal patterns, and specifying manifesting irregu-
lar forms needing memorization. It has a purely semantic form as its base, 
not a partially phonologized form, and puts all phonologizing rules direct-
·.ly into the surface manifestation rules. It posits an abstract (or psycho-
logical) sememe, but avoids the need for further abstractions. 
To sum up, Chafe's case for his underlying abstractions and processes 
ia considerably weaker than it appears on the surface. And there is a 
certain amount of appeal in models that admit both process and allomorph 
statements. We are still in the position of blind men examining the ele-
phant: the beast (language) is bigger and more complex than any of our 
theories. 
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